## Why Weekly compliance review (2026-06-07) surfaced the toil problem head-on: | Report | Unmuted findings | Muted | Acted on | |--------|------------------|-------|----------| | **K8s CIS (In-Cluster)** | 0 | 65 | clean ✅ | | **Container Images** | 20,005 (+713 WoW) | 0 | never | | **IaC (manifests)** | 654 (+31/−30 WoW) | 0 | never | The image and IaC scans generate tens of thousands of un-actioned, un-muted findings every week: - **Image scan** — overwhelmingly unpatchable *upstream* base-image CVEs, and it re-scans every historical tag still in the registry (2× paperless, 3× mealie, 4× prowler tags in the latest report), multiplying the count. - **IaC scan** — systemic Trivy KSV pod-security warnings against our own manifests; real but homelab-acceptable, never muted, so re-surfaced indefinitely. The K8s CIS scan is the only one with realized value (fully mutelisted, 0 unmuted WoW) and is retained. Matches the broader scaling-back of the reporting system as minikube heads toward retirement. ## Changes - Delete `cronjob-image-scan.yaml` and `cronjob-iac-scan.yaml` + remove from kustomization - Drop the now-unused `mutelist/trivyignore.yaml` (only the IaC scan consumed it) - `review-compliance-reports`: drop the two retired scans (and the grouped-findings rendering that existed solely for them) - Docs: deploy-prowler (new 'Why only the K8s CIS scan' section), read-compliance-reports, security reference, prowler reference ## Deploy (after review) ```fish argocd app set prowler --revision retire-prowler-image-iac-scans argocd app sync prowler # prune removes the two CronJobs # after merge: argocd app set prowler --revision main && argocd app sync prowler ``` 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Reviewed-on: #372
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| title | modified | last-reviewed | tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Security & Compliance | 2026-06-08 | 2026-03-24 |
|
Security & Compliance
Security posture and compliance scanning for BlumeOps infrastructure.
Compliance frameworks
| Framework | Tool | Cluster | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| CIS Kubernetes Benchmark v1.11 | prowler | minikube-indri | Weekly CronJob, ~82 checks |
| PCI DSS v4.0 (K8s mapping) | prowler | minikube-indri | Reuses CIS checks mapped to PCI requirements |
| ISO 27001:2022 (K8s mapping) | prowler | minikube-indri | Partial — 22 of 92 controls mapped |
Scanning tools
- prowler — CIS Kubernetes Benchmark scanner (weekly CronJob). The container-image CVE scan and IaC scan were retired in 2026-06 (un-actioned noise — see deploy-prowler#Why only the K8s CIS scan); only the K8s CIS scan remains.
- deploy-prowler — deployment and ad-hoc scan how-to
- read-compliance-reports — accessing and interpreting reports
- kingfisher — Secret detection and live validation for Forgejo repos (weekly CronJob + prek hook)
Identity & access
- authentik — SSO/OIDC provider for all web services
- RBAC — Kubernetes role-based access control (audited by Prowler RBAC checks)
Network & TLS
- caddy — TLS termination for
*.ops.eblu.meservices - flyio-proxy — public ingress via Fly.io tunnel
- Tailscale — zero-trust mesh networking across all nodes
Secrets management
- 1password — root credential store
- external-secrets — Kubernetes secrets synced from 1Password
Reports
All compliance scan reports are stored on sifaka:/volume1/reports/. See read-compliance-reports for access and interpretation.
Suppressed findings are kept in Prowler mutelist YAML under argocd/manifests/prowler/mutelist/. Each entry's Description field explains why the finding is muted; entries are reviewed ad-hoc rather than on a scheduled cadence.
Known gaps
- No SOC 2 compliance mapping for Kubernetes (Prowler only maps SOC 2 for AWS/Azure/GCP)
- k3s control plane checks produce no results (embedded binary, no static pods) — consider kube-bench
- No container-image CVE scanning (the Prowler image scan was retired 2026-06 as un-actioned noise). If reintroduced, scope it to critical-severity, currently-deployed tags, alert-on-new
- No automated IaC misconfiguration scanning (the Prowler IaC scan was retired 2026-06). Manifest pod-security hardening is now an accept-and-document decision rather than a weekly report