- Added '--repo-artifacts' flag to scan repository issues, gists/snippets, and wikis when cloning via '--git-url'

- Added rules for sendbird, mattermost, langchain, notion
- JWT validation hardened to reject alg:none by default (only allowed if explicitly configured), require iss for OIDC/JWKS verification, ensuring Active Credential means cryptographically verified and time-valid, not just unexpired
- Updated the Git cloning logic to include all refs and minimize clone output, allowing Kingfisher to analyze pull request and deleted branch history
This commit is contained in:
Mick Grove 2025-08-21 15:39:04 -07:00
commit 81d2f47c67
11 changed files with 442 additions and 114 deletions

View file

@ -46,8 +46,33 @@ struct Claims {
aud: Option<Aud>,
}
/// Runtime options for JWT validation policy.
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
pub struct ValidateOptions {
/// If true, accept unsigned tokens (`alg: "none"`) as long as temporal checks pass.
/// Default is **false** (more secure).
pub allow_alg_none: bool,
/// If provided and `iss` is absent, use this key to cryptographically verify the token.
/// Useful for non-OIDC flows where you already know the verification key.
pub fallback_decoding_key: Option<DecodingKey>,
}
/// Backwards-compatible entry point with secure defaults:
/// - `alg: none` is **rejected**
/// - `iss` is **required** unless `fallback_decoding_key` is supplied (not supplied here)
pub async fn validate_jwt(token: &str) -> Result<(bool, String)> {
// --- insecure payload decode -------------------------------------------------
validate_jwt_with(
token,
&ValidateOptions { allow_alg_none: false, fallback_decoding_key: None },
)
.await
}
/// Strict validator with policy control.
/// Returns (is_active_credential, explanation).
pub async fn validate_jwt_with(token: &str, opts: &ValidateOptions) -> Result<(bool, String)> {
// --- insecure payload decode to read claims --------------------------------
let claims: Claims = {
let payload_b64 = token.split('.').nth(1).ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("invalid JWT format"))?;
let payload_json = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
@ -69,132 +94,146 @@ pub async fn validate_jwt(token: &str) -> Result<(bool, String)> {
}
}
// parse header (for alg, kid)
let header_b64 = token.split('.').next().ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("invalid JWT format"))?;
let header_json =
URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(header_b64).map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid base64 in header: {e}"))?;
let header_val: serde_json::Value =
serde_json::from_slice(&header_json).map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid header json: {e}"))?;
let alg_str = header_val.get("alg").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
let header = decode_header(token).map_err(|e| anyhow!("decode header: {e}"))?;
let alg = header.alg;
// If alg is "none", skip signature/JWKS entirely
// --- Policy: reject `alg: none` unless explicitly allowed ------------------
if alg_str.eq_ignore_ascii_case("none") {
// still enforce your time/claims checks that already ran
return Ok((
true,
format!(
"JWT valid (alg: none, iss: {}, aud: {:?})",
claims.iss.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
extract_aud_strings(&claims),
),
));
if opts.allow_alg_none {
// time-valid is enough if explicitly allowed
return Ok((
true,
format!(
"JWT valid (alg: none, iss: {}, aud: {:?})",
claims.iss.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
extract_aud_strings(&claims),
),
));
} else {
return Ok((false, "unsigned JWT (alg: none) not allowed".into()));
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
let issuer = claims.iss.clone().unwrap_or_default();
let aud_strings = extract_aud_strings(&claims);
if issuer.trim().is_empty() && aud_strings.iter().all(|s| s.trim().is_empty()) {
return Ok((false, "JWT missing issuer and audience".into()));
}
if let Some(iss) = claims.iss.clone() {
// parse header now (kid, alg)
let header = decode_header(token).map_err(|e| anyhow!("decode header: {e}"))?;
let alg = header.alg;
// --- New rule: require `iss` OR use fallback key for crypto verification ---
if issuer.trim().is_empty() {
// No issuer — we may still accept if we can cryptographically verify with a fallback key
if let Some(decoding_key) = opts.fallback_decoding_key.as_ref() {
// Verify signature (aud checked if present)
let mut validation = JwtValidation::new(alg);
if !aud_strings.is_empty() {
validation.set_audience(&aud_strings);
}
// We already did exp/nbf manually.
validation.validate_exp = false;
validation.validate_nbf = false;
// build discovery URL and fetch it (redirects disabled)
let config_url = format!("{}/.well-known/openid-configuration", iss.trim_end_matches('/'));
let cfg_resp = NO_REDIRECT_CLIENT
.get(&config_url)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("issuer discovery failed: {e}"))?;
decode::<Claims>(token, decoding_key, &validation)
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("signature verification (fallback key) failed: {e}"))?;
if !cfg_resp.status().is_success() {
return Ok((false, format!("issuer discovery failed: {}", cfg_resp.status())));
}
let cfg_json: serde_json::Value =
cfg_resp.json().await.map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid discovery JSON: {e}"))?;
// extract jwks_uri
let jwks_uri = cfg_json
.get("jwks_uri")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("jwks_uri missing"))?;
// must be HTTPS
let url = Url::parse(jwks_uri).map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid jwks_uri: {e}"))?;
if url.scheme() != "https" {
return Ok((false, "jwks_uri must use https".to_string()));
}
// host must match issuer host  —  prevents open redirects / SSRF-on-other-host
let iss_host = Url::parse(&iss)
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid iss: {e}"))?
.host_str()
.unwrap_or_default()
.to_ascii_lowercase();
let jwks_host = url.host_str().unwrap_or_default().to_ascii_lowercase();
if jwks_host != iss_host {
return Ok((
true,
format!("JWT valid via fallback key (alg: {:?}, aud: {:?})", alg, aud_strings),
));
} else {
return Ok((
false,
format!("jwks_uri host ({jwks_host}) must match issuer host ({iss_host})"),
"issuer (iss) required or a fallback verification key must be provided".into(),
));
}
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// DNS resolution + private-range block
for addr in lookup_host((jwks_host.as_str(), 443)).await? {
if is_blocked_ip(addr.ip()) {
return Ok((false, "jwks_uri resolves to private or link-local IP".to_string()));
}
}
// --- With `iss`: OIDC discovery + JWKS verification path -------------------
// build discovery URL and fetch it (redirects disabled)
let config_url = format!("{}/.well-known/openid-configuration", issuer.trim_end_matches('/'));
let cfg_resp = NO_REDIRECT_CLIENT
.get(&config_url)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("issuer discovery failed: {e}"))?;
// reachability check (existing helper)
check_url_resolvable(&url).await.map_err(|e| anyhow!("jwks uri unresolvable: {e}"))?;
if !cfg_resp.status().is_success() {
return Ok((false, format!("issuer discovery failed: {}", cfg_resp.status())));
}
// fetch JWKS with redirect-free client
let jwks_resp = NO_REDIRECT_CLIENT
.get(url)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("jwks fetch failed: {e}"))?;
if !jwks_resp.status().is_success() {
return Ok((false, format!("jwks fetch failed: {}", jwks_resp.status())));
}
let cfg_json: serde_json::Value =
cfg_resp.json().await.map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid discovery JSON: {e}"))?;
let jwk_set: JwkSet =
jwks_resp.json().await.map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid jwks json: {e}"))?;
// extract jwks_uri
let jwks_uri = cfg_json
.get("jwks_uri")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("jwks_uri missing"))?;
// select key by kid
let kid = header.kid.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("no kid in header"))?;
let jwk = jwk_set
.keys
.iter()
.find(|k| k.common.key_id.as_deref() == Some(&kid))
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("kid not found in jwks"))?;
// verify signature
let decoding_key = DecodingKey::from_jwk(jwk).map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid jwk: {e}"))?;
let mut validation = JwtValidation::new(header.alg);
validation.set_audience(&extract_aud_strings(&claims));
validation.validate_exp = false;
validation.validate_nbf = false;
decode::<Claims>(token, &decoding_key, &validation)
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("signature verification failed: {e}"))?;
// must be HTTPS
let url = Url::parse(jwks_uri).map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid jwks_uri: {e}"))?;
if url.scheme() != "https" {
return Ok((false, "jwks_uri must use https".to_string()));
}
// host must match issuer host
let iss_host = Url::parse(&issuer)
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid iss: {e}"))?
.host_str()
.unwrap_or_default()
.to_ascii_lowercase();
let jwks_host = url.host_str().unwrap_or_default().to_ascii_lowercase();
if jwks_host != iss_host {
return Ok((
true,
format!(
"JWT valid (alg: {:?}, iss: {issuer}, aud: {:?})",
alg,
extract_aud_strings(&claims)
),
false,
format!("jwks_uri host ({jwks_host}) must match issuer host ({iss_host})"),
));
}
Ok((true, format!("JWT not expired (iss: {issuer}, aud: {:?})", extract_aud_strings(&claims))))
// DNS resolution + private-range block
for addr in lookup_host((jwks_host.as_str(), 443)).await? {
if is_blocked_ip(addr.ip()) {
return Ok((false, "jwks_uri resolves to private or link-local IP".to_string()));
}
}
// reachability check (existing helper)
check_url_resolvable(&url).await.map_err(|e| anyhow!("jwks uri unresolvable: {e}"))?;
// fetch JWKS with redirect-free client
let jwks_resp =
NO_REDIRECT_CLIENT.get(url).send().await.map_err(|e| anyhow!("jwks fetch failed: {e}"))?;
if !jwks_resp.status().is_success() {
return Ok((false, format!("jwks fetch failed: {}", jwks_resp.status())));
}
let jwk_set: JwkSet = jwks_resp.json().await.map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid jwks json: {e}"))?;
// select key by kid
let kid = header.kid.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("no kid in header"))?;
let jwk = jwk_set
.keys
.iter()
.find(|k| k.common.key_id.as_deref() == Some(&kid))
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("kid not found in jwks"))?;
// verify signature
let decoding_key = DecodingKey::from_jwk(jwk).map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid jwk: {e}"))?;
let mut validation = JwtValidation::new(header.alg);
if !aud_strings.is_empty() {
validation.set_audience(&aud_strings);
}
validation.validate_exp = false;
validation.validate_nbf = false;
decode::<Claims>(token, &decoding_key, &validation)
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("signature verification failed: {e}"))?;
Ok((true, format!("JWT valid (alg: {:?}, iss: {issuer}, aud: {:?})", alg, aud_strings)))
}
/// Helper: normalize aud into a flat Vec<String>
@ -212,12 +251,11 @@ fn is_blocked_ip(ip: std::net::IpAddr) -> bool {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{validate_jwt, validate_jwt_with, ValidateOptions};
use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine as _};
use chrono::{Duration as ChronoDuration, Utc};
use super::validate_jwt;
fn build_token(exp_offset: i64) -> String {
fn build_unsigned_token(exp_offset: i64) -> String {
let header = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(r#"{"alg":"none"}"#);
let exp = (Utc::now() + ChronoDuration::seconds(exp_offset)).timestamp();
let payload = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(format!(
@ -231,16 +269,35 @@ mod tests {
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn valid_token() {
let token = build_token(60);
async fn unsigned_token_rejected_by_default() {
let token = build_unsigned_token(60);
let res = validate_jwt(&token).await.unwrap();
assert!(res.0);
assert!(!res.0);
assert!(res.1.contains("unsigned JWT (alg: none) not allowed"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn expired_token() {
let token = build_token(-60);
let res = validate_jwt(&token).await.unwrap();
async fn valid_token_allows_alg_none_when_opted_in() {
let token = build_unsigned_token(60);
let res = validate_jwt_with(
&token,
&ValidateOptions { allow_alg_none: true, fallback_decoding_key: None },
)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(res.0, "expected success when alg none is explicitly allowed");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn expired_token_still_rejected() {
let token = build_unsigned_token(-60);
let res = validate_jwt_with(
&token,
&ValidateOptions { allow_alg_none: true, fallback_decoding_key: None },
)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(!res.0);
assert!(res.1.contains("expired"));
}
}