--- title: Snowflake Proxy modified: 2026-03-24 tags: - service - privacy - anti-censorship --- # Snowflake Proxy Tor Snowflake proxy that helps censored users reach the Tor network. Runs as a native systemd service on [[ringtail]]. ## Quick Reference | Property | Value | |----------|-------| | **Host** | ringtail | | **Type** | NixOS systemd service | | **Package** | `pkgs.snowflake` (nixpkgs) | | **Binary** | `proxy` | | **Upstream** | https://snowflake.torproject.org/ | | **Source** | https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake | | **Metrics** | `localhost:9999/metrics` (Prometheus) | ## Architecture Snowflake is a pluggable transport for Tor that uses WebRTC to provide short-lived proxies. The proxy: 1. Polls the Tor broker for censored clients needing a bridge 2. Establishes a WebRTC connection with the client 3. Forwards the encrypted traffic to a Tor bridge (relay) **This proxy is NOT a Tor exit node.** Traffic exits through Tor exit nodes operated by others. The proxy operator cannot see traffic content (double-encrypted: WebRTC DTLS + Tor onion routing) and destination servers never see the proxy's IP. ``` Censored user ──[WebRTC/DTLS]──▶ THIS PROXY ──[encrypted]──▶ Tor bridge ──▶ Tor network ──▶ Exit node ``` ## Configuration The service runs with default settings — no special configuration needed. Key defaults: | Setting | Value | |---------|-------| | **Broker** | `https://snowflake-broker.torproject.net/` | | **Relay** | `wss://snowflake.torproject.net/` | | **STUN** | Google + BlackBerry STUN servers | | **Capacity** | Unlimited concurrent clients | | **Summary interval** | 1 hour | | **Metrics port** | 9999 (Prometheus format) | ## Resource Usage Based on community reports, a Snowflake proxy typically uses: - **Bandwidth:** ~5-10 GB/day (varies with client demand) - **Memory:** Under 100 MB - **CPU:** Negligible ## Legal Considerations Running a Snowflake proxy carries very low legal risk in the US: - Traffic does not exit from the proxy's IP (exit nodes are elsewhere) - Content is not visible to the proxy operator (end-to-end encrypted) - No known legal cases against Snowflake proxy operators worldwide - EFF and Tor Project both classify this as minimal-risk activity - US intermediary protections (Section 230, ECPA) apply ## Related - [[ringtail]] - Host machine - [[architecture]] - Overall system design