The control claimed all images came from the private registry, but 12+
services pull from external public registries. Updated description to
reflect reality and catalogued external-image categories in notes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verified: tailscale serve status shows only svc:k8s, ACLs restrict
tag:flyio-target to port 443 with admin/operator ownership only,
indri has no flyio-target tag. All 10 muted findings remain valid.
Noted gap: no automated alerting on new flyio-target devices.
Tracked in Todoist as MC4 (Manual Compliance Control Check CronJob).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stamp single-user-cluster last-reviewed to 2026-04-01 after verifying
Tailscale ACLs and kubeconfig distribution. Add aspirational how-to card
documenting what PCI DSS evidence collection would look like (CCW,
artifacts, Drata workflow). Link from existing review process card.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>