Internet traffic hits Fly.io's Anycast edge, terminates TLS with a Let's Encrypt certificate, and is proxied by nginx to the backend service over a Tailscale WireGuard tunnel. See [[expose-service-publicly]] for the full architecture diagram.
Nginx uses `upstream` blocks with `keepalive` connection pools to reuse TLS connections through the WireGuard tunnel. This avoids a per-request TLS handshake, which was previously the dominant source of latency (35s+ p50 before keepalive, sub-second after).
**Trade-off:** DNS for upstream hostnames is resolved once at config load, not per-request. If Tailscale Ingress pods get new IPs (restart, reschedule, minikube restart), run `mise run fly-reload` to re-resolve without a full redeploy. A Grafana alert fires when upstreams are unreachable.
Each upstream requires `proxy_ssl_name` set to the actual Tailscale hostname — nginx sends the upstream block name as SNI by default, which the Tailscale Ingress proxy won't recognize.
| `pulumi/tailscale/policy.hujson` | ACL grants for proxy |
| `pulumi/gandi/__main__.py` | DNS CNAMEs |
## Networking
Fly.io runs Firecracker microVMs which support TUN devices natively. Tailscale runs with a real TUN interface (not userspace networking), so MagicDNS and direct Tailscale IP routing work normally.
The Tailscale auth key is `preauthorized=True` to avoid device approval hangs on container restarts.
The `tag:flyio-proxy` ACL grants access only to `tag:flyio-target:443`. Services must explicitly opt in by adding a `tailscale.com/tags: "tag:k8s,tag:flyio-target"` annotation to their Tailscale Ingress. This means the proxy can only reach endpoints that have been individually tagged — a compromised nginx config cannot route to arbitrary services on the tailnet.
Currently tagged as `tag:flyio-target`: [[docs]], [[cv]], [[forgejo]], [[loki]], [[prometheus]]. Loki and Prometheus are tagged so that [[alloy|Alloy]] (running inside the container) can push logs and metrics directly via their Tailscale Ingress endpoints — the restricted ACL means Caddy on indri (`tag:homelab`) is not reachable from the proxy.
### Crawler Mitigation
The proxy serves a `robots.txt` blocking crawlers from expensive endpoints:
-`/*/archive/` — git bundle generation (DoS vector, see below)
-`/*/releases/download/` — release artifacts
Archive requests (`/<owner>/<repo>/archive/*`) are 302-redirected to `forge.ops.eblu.me` (tailnet-only), preventing unauthenticated archive generation. This mitigates a known Forgejo DoS vector where crawlers requesting unique commit SHAs trigger unbounded git bundle generation.
Release downloads are cached at the proxy layer (7-day TTL, keyed by URI) to absorb repeated downloads of the same artifact.
To expose an additional service through the proxy, add the `tag:flyio-target` annotation to its Tailscale Ingress. See [[expose-service-publicly]] for the full workflow.
The SPA fallback (`try_files ... /index.html`) serves `index.html` with a 200 for *any* URI, including non-existent paths. Quartz's relative links (`../path`) compound when resolved from phantom URLs, creating an infinite tree of unique URIs that crawlers follow indefinitely. In March 2026, Meta's crawler (`meta-externalagent/1.1`) hit ~49,000 unique URIs over 7 hours this way.
Two nginx `location` guards in `containers/quartz/default.conf` mitigate the trap:
2.**Global depth-5 cutoff** — real content never exceeds depth 4; paths with 5+ segments return 404.
These are applied in the Quartz container's nginx config, not the Fly.io proxy. The proper fix is switching Quartz to root-absolute links (planned for the fork).